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THE USE OF CONDITIONS IN LAND-USE CONTROL
BY WALTER M. STRINE, JR.*
As another break-through toward suburbanization of rural
Concord Township, the [board of] supervisors reduced the home
site size requirement from three to one acre on [a] 118-acre tract ...
The supervisors, however, moved cautiously . . . [following]
a "control by conditions" policy in downgrading zoning. . . . In
agreeing to cut the lot size, the supervisors made their decision
contingent on [the builder's] willingness to plant two deciduous
trees on each lot, give $200 to the school district for each house
built, put the sale price of the homes at not less than $23,500, have
a 200-foot frontage for each home, 20-foot roads with rolled gutters
through the development and off-street parking plus a T turning
area of adequate size.'
Taken from a suburban Philadelphia newspaper, this excerpt illustrates
the current widespread practice among local governhnent officials of imposing
conditions when authorizing a change in land use. 2 This practice, along with
such innovations as subdivision regulations,3 zoning by performance standards,4 and the use of "floating zones," 5 represents another attempt to achieve
greater flexibility in land-use control than can be achieved by conventional
Euclidean zoning.6 The objective of this Article is to examine what limits
have been or should be placed on this use of conditions.7
* A.B., 1958, Princeton University; LL.B., 1961, Harvard Law School; member,
Pennsylvania Bar.
The author wishes to acknowledge his gratitude to Professor Charles M. Haar
of the Harvard Law School for encouragement and advice in the preparation of this
paper.
1. Delaware County (Pa.) Daily Times, April 19, 1960, p. 13.
2. See, e.g., Church v. Town of Islip, 8 App. Div. 2d 962, 190 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1959),
aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866, 168 N.E.2d 680 (1960).
3. See HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 347-408 (1959).
4. See Horack, Performance Standards in Residential Zoning, 1952 PLANNING
153; O'Harrow, Performance Standards in Industrial Zoning, PLANNING ADVISORY
SERVicE BULL. (Am. Soc'y Plan. Off.) 1 (1951).
5. See Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957) ; Eves
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960). See also Haar & Hering,
The Lower Gwynedd Township Case: Too Flexible Zoning or an Inflexible Judiciary?,
74 HARV.L. REV. 1552 (1961).
6. As used here, the term "Euclidean zoning" means zoning by use districts.
7. Little writing has been done on this subject. Most of the treatises on land-use
controls devote only a few paragraphs to the questions presented. See, e.g., BASSETT,
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Focusing on some of the most important devices in a modern system
of land-use control, namely, building permits and certificates of occupancy,
variances and exceptions, subdivision map approval, and zoning amendments,
the first part of this Article is intended to show what general restrictions
have been placed on the imposition of conditions. In the second part an
effort is made to indicate certain trends which have appeared in the case
law and to point up certain factors upon which the courts seem to rely
when deciding given cases.
At the outset it should be mentioned that no attempt is made herein to
discuss the validity of conditions imposed on developers of urban renewal
or public housing projects because of the vastly different policy considerations
involved.' Also, court-imposed conditions have been omitted from discussion
because they emanate from a different source of power than conditions imposed by a local ordinance or official. 9
GENERAL RESTRICTIONS GOVERNING IMPOSITION OF CONDITIONS

Conditions Attached to a Building Permit or Certificate of Occupancy

Local officials charged with the duty of issuing building permits or
certificates of occupancy have the authority to refuse to act until the applicant
has complied with conditions set forth in the ordinance under which the permit
or certificate is to be issued.'" To be valid, however, these conditions must
be within the scope of the police power."
Government officials often try to impose conditions which have not been
expressly authorized by ordinance, using what is known as the "privilege"
argument. 12 This argument asserts that, since the government has the power
(hereinafter cited as BASSETT, ZONING) 128-29, 184 (1936) ; YOKLEY,
ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 144 (2d ed. 1953). The treatment which Metzenbaum
(METZENBAUM, LAW OF ZONING 957-76 (2d ed. 1955)) and Rathkopf (1 RATHKOPF,
THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 392-95, 755-71 (3d ed. 1957)) give to the subject
is more extensive, but is limited to a collection of excerpts from cases which are largely
TWENTY YEARS

concerned with conditional variances or exceptions. One of the most helpful articles
that has considered any aspect of this subject is Reps, Legal and Administrative Aspects
of Conditional Zoning Variances and Exceptions, 2 SYRACUSE L. REV. 54 (1950).
8. For cases dealing with such conditions, see St. Stephen's Club v. Youngstown
Metropolitan Housing Authority, 160 Ohio St. 194, 115 N.E.2d 385 (1953) ; Blumenschein v. Housing Authority, 379 Pa. 566, 109 A.2d 331 (1954). See also Note,
Enforceability of Contracts Between Local Housing Authorities and City Councils, 50
YALE L.J. 525 (1941); Goldston & Scheuer, Zoning of Planned Residential Developinents, 73 HARV. L. REV. 241 (1959).

9. For cases dealing with such conditions, see Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal. App. 2d
348, 203 P.2d 37 (1949) ; Hopkins v. Board of Appeals, 179 Misc. 325, 39 N.Y.S.2d 167

(Sup. Ct. 1942); People ex rel. St. Albans-Springfield Corp. v. Connell, 257 N.Y. 73,
177 N.E. 313 (1931) ; Taft v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 76 R.I. 443, 71 A.2d 886 (1950).
10. See, e.g., City of East Lansing v. Wilson, 332 Mich. 96, 50 N.W.2d 730 (1952).
11. Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E.2d 503 (1952).
12. See Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 321 (1935).
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to withhold permission entirely, it may grant permission in a limited form,
as the greater power of withholding absolutely must necessarily include the
lesser power of granting with restrictions. In the area of issuance of building
permits or certificates of occupancy this argument is without force, because
it is well established that, if the applicant complies with the standard set
forth in the relevant ordinance, the building inspector or similar official has
no discretion to withhold a permit.13 This fact undercuts the major premise
of the above argument and makes it difficult for officials to justify importing
14
into the law a condition not clearly contained in it.
Thus, where a building inspector was given authority to issue a certificate of occupancy within ten days after erection of a building if such
building complied with the zoning regulations, it was improper for him to
issue the permit subject to a condition that the tract on which the proposed
building was to be located would in the future be conveyed only as a single
unit, when that condition was not specifically stated in the ordinance under
which the inspector acted. 15 The zoning board of appeals, in its capacity
as an appellate mechanism reviewing decisions of building inspectors,'16 often
has an opportunity to attach conditions to the issuance of building permits.
But in exercising this function, the board is not free, just as the building
inspector and planning commission were not free, to impose conditions not
specifically set forth in the controlling ordinance."7 Hence, it was improper
for the board to refuse to issue a building permit until the applicant would
agree to comply with a setback condition not required by ordinance,' 8 even
though it would have been proper to impose such a condition if the board
had been dealing with an application for a variance or special exception. 19
Also, where the board reviews the action of a municipal official in revoking
13. See Teglund v. Dodge, 316 Mich. 185, 25 N.W.2d 161 (1946); Leonard Inv.
Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 122 N.J.L. 308, 4 A.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
14. See Loew v. Falsey, 144 Conn. 67, 127 A.2d 67 (1956).
15. Purtill v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 146 Conn. 570, 153 A.2d 441 (1959).
Accord, Ricciardi v. Los Angeles County, 115 Cal. App. 2d 569, 252 P.2d 773 (1953) ;
Reggs Homes, Inc. v. Dickerson, 16 Misc. 2d 732, 179 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1958),
aff'd nen., 8 App. Div. 2d 640, 186 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1959).
16. For enumeration of the functions of a typical zoning board of appeals see
STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING AcT § 7 (drafted and recommended by the United
States Department of Commerce in 1926 and subsequently used as a model by many
states when they adopted a zoning enabling statute), found in 2 RATHKOPF, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 877-82.
17. See Abbadessa v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 134 Conn. 28, 54 A.2d 675 (1947)
cf. Kelley v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 126 Conn. 648, 13 A.2d 675 (1940).
18. Fairmount Inv. Co. v. Woermann, 210 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1948).
19. See Wheeler v. Gregg, supra note 9; authority cited and text accompanying
note 25 infra; but cf. Vangellow v. City of Rochester, 190 Misc. 128, 71 N.Y.S.2d 672
(Sup. Ct. 1947) (dictum).
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a permit and decides that the revocation was improper, there is authority to
20
the effect that the board has no power to impose any conditions.
Occasionally, however, an enabling act or local ordinance pertaining to
issuance of building and construction permits will contain a general phrase
authorizing the imposition of "appropriate conditions,"21 or the act or
ordinance may contain extremely broad wording from which a court will
imply the power to impose conditions.22 But, as will be discussed in the
following section, regardless of whether a condition is specifically or generally
authorized or is imposed under a power implied from broad wording in an
enabling act or local ordinance, such condition will be valid only if within
the scope of the police power; that is, it will be upheld only if it relates reasonably to the public health, safety, morals or welfare.
23
Conditions Attached to a Variance or Exception

Whereas most state enabling acts dealing with building permits make
no mention of any power to impose conditions, 24 the Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act specifically authorizes a board of appeals to attach conditions
when issuing a variance or exception.2 5 However, not all state zoning enabling
acts are so explicit. For example, the New York Town Zoning and Planning
Law provides:
Where there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships in the
way of carrying out the strict letter of such ordinances, the board
of appeals shall have the power in passing upon appeals, to vary or
modify the application of any of the regulations or provisions of such
ordinance relating to the use, construction or alteration of buildings
or structures, or the use of land, so that the spirit of the ordinance
shall be observed,
public safety and welfare secured and substantial
20
justice done.
20. Appeal of Tool & Mfg. Co., 104 Pitt. L.J. 243 (Pa. C.P. 1954).
21. See, e.g., Kiowa Lumber Co, v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 185 Okla. 641,

95 P.2d 592 (1939).
22. See, e.g., County Council v. Lee, 219 Md.209, 148 A.2d 568 (1959) (alternative
ground).
23. For an analysis of the variance procedure see Note, Zoning Variances, 74
HARV. L. REV. 1396 (1961).
24. See, e.g., NEW YORK TOWN LAW § 130(1).
25. Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 7.
26. NEW YORK TOWN LAW § 267(5). Compare the following provisions of the
Pennsylvania County Code:
Any zoning ordinance of the board of county commissioners may provide
that the board of adjustment may, in appropriate cases and subject to appropriate principles, standards, rules, conditions and safeguards set forth in the
zoning ordinance, make special exceptions to the terms of the zoning regulations in harmony with their general purpose and intent.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2029(d) (1956).
Where, by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness or shape of a
specific piece of property at the time of the enactment of the regulation, or
by reason of excetional topographical conditions or other extraordinary and
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Some New York courts have said that the board of appeals has the "inherent
power" to condition the issuance of variances or exceptions, 27 but others,
feeling a need to find some statutory basis for the board's action, have pointed
to the "spirit of the ordinance" phrase as an implicit authorization for the
28
use of conditions.
Although conditions attached to a variance apparently need not be stated
in the local ordinance empowering the board of appeals to act,2 a number of
cases say that only conditions enumerated in the ordinance may be attached
to an exception.80 These decisions seem to emanate from a statement in the
New Hampshire case of Stone v. Cray3' that the conditions for granting a
special exception could not be varied by the board of appeals. This statement seems to have been based on the theory that if the board could vary
the conditions, it would be able to exercise unbridled discretion, and consequently, the ordinance permitting the board to grant exceptions would constitute an improper delegation by the local legislative body.32 Though the
Stone dictum supports the proposition that the board may not disregard the
standards of decision set forth in the ordinance, it need not be interpreted
as prohibiting all conditions except those set forth in the ordinance because,
since the decisional standards are generally quite broad (thereby vesting
considerable discretion in the board), it would be possible for that body to
impose conditions without deviating from these standards. 33 In states having
zoning enabling statutes patterned after the New York Town Zoning and
Planning Act or the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, conditions attached
to an exception have generally been permitted. 34 In other states which appear
to follow the rule prohibiting conditions unless expressed in the ordinance,
exceptional situation or condition of such piece of property, the strict application of any regulation enacted under this subdivision would result in peculiar
and exceptional practical difficulties to or exceptional and undue hardship upon
the owner of such property [the board of adjustment shall be empowered] to
authorize, upon an appeal relating to said property, a variance from such strict
application so as to relieve such difficulties or hardships ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2030(b) (3) (1956).
27. E.g., Hopkins v. Board of Appeals, supra note 9.
28. E.g., People ex rel. Helvetia Realty Co. v. Leo, 183 N.Y. Supp. 37 (Sup. Ct.

1920), aff'd inem., 195 App. Div. 887, 185 N.Y. Supp. 949 (1921), aff'd inen., 231 N.Y.
619, 132 N.E. 912 (1921).
29. Indeed, several cases hold that it is error to have issued a variance without
conditions. Youngs v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 127 Conn. 715, 17 A.2d 513 (1941)
Strauss v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 72 R.I. 107, 48 A.2d 349 (1946).
30. E.g., Service Realty Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 141 Conn.

632, 109 A.2d 256 (1954).
31. 89 N.H. 483, 200 Atl. 517 (1938).
32.
33.

See Service Realty Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Bd. of Appeals, supra note 30.
See North Plainfield v. Perone, 54 N.J. Super. 1, 148 A.2d 50 (1959), cert.

denied, 29 N.J. 507, 150 A.2d 292 (1959).
34.

See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Mossburg, 228 Md. 555, 180 A.2d 851 (1962).
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inconsistencies seem to have developed in the precedents. 3 5 It may be that if
a "special exception" is denominated a "conditional use permit" in the local
ordinances, courts will not be troubled by the Stone dictum.
As to the scope of conditions which may be imposed without being
expressed in the ordinance, Bassett contends:
[C]onditions are not limited to the scope of the police power ...
[C]onditions imposed on variance permits are not regulations. They
express the protective adaptations
necessary to secure the required
3 61
vote in the board of appeals.
Although his statement was limited to conditions attached to a variance,
if it is assumed that conditions" not expressed in the ordinance may be
attached to an exception, the statement would seem to apply equally well
to them because they may also express adaptations necessary to secure the
required vote.
The "privilege" theory is often urged in support of Bassett's position
that conditions are not limited to the scope of the police power.3 Because it
may be contended that, in granting a variance or exception, the board of
appeals is not only granting permission to do something, but is in fact conferring a positive benefit on the applicant by returning to him that part of
the fee which the municipality took when it enacted the zoning ordinance
restricting the use of the premises in question, it could be argued that since
the board has absolute discretion to withhold the benefit, it must also have
the right to grant it subject to any condition which it desires to impose.
However, even if a more progressive view were taken '8 and it were conceded
that the power to impose conditions is not unlimited, it may be contended
that the board of appeals would at least have the power to impose any condition which is relevant to the attainment of the objectives involved in the
extension of the benefit, even though such condition is beyond the scope of
the police power. For instance, since one of the objectives in granting a
variance or exception is to achieve some flexibility in land-use control while

at the same time minimizing the annoyance and inconvenience to the present
land users, the board would be able to attach to a variance permitting construction of a gasoline station in a residential area a condition requiring the
applicant to use a colonial design where the surrounding homes are colonial,
35. Compare Service Realty Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Bd. of Appeals, supra
note 30, with Mitchell Land Co. v. Planning & Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 140 Conn. 527,
102 A.2d 316 (1953).
36. BASSETT, ZONING 128-29 (1936).
37. For a recent discussion of the use of this argument in contexts other than
zoning, see Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
38. Ibid.
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115

even though the condition is not generally regarded as related to the health,
39
safety, or welfare of the community.
Perhaps the best answer to these arguments is expressed in the simple
proposition that "the use of an administrative device under a basic law
certainly cannot go beyond the scope of the law itself." 40 Indeed, if it could
go beyond, thereby permitting the board of appeals to accomplish what it
could not accomplish under the basic law, state control would be effectively
terminated and constitutional problems of the permissible scope of delegation
would arise.
Conditions of the Approval of Subdivision Maps
Courts have generally handled subdivision map cases in much the same
way as they have building permit cases. Hence, there are many decisions
stating that if an applicant complies with the standards set forth in the
41
relevant ordinance, the planning commission has no discretion to withhold
42
or condition approval of a proposed map. These decisions may be founded
on the questionable assumption that because approval of a subdivision map
does not usually effect a change in the permitted pattern of land use 43 (as
would a variance or exception), the commission occupies a less important
role than other officials who administer a system of land-use controls. 44
39. The example was taken from BASSETT, ZONING 129 (1936). See generally the
discussion of Aesthetic Conditions, pp. 134-35 infra.
40. Reps, supra note 7, at 57.
41. Tuxedo Homes v. Green, 258 Ala. 314, 63 So. 2d 812 (1953); Beach v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 141 Conn. 79, 103 A.2d 814 (1954). Cf. Magnolia Dev. Co. v.
Coles, 10 N.J. 223, 89 A.2d 664 (1952) (mayor and council held to have no discretion
to refuse to approve proposed map).
42. Langbein v. Planning Bd., 145 Conn. 674, 146 A.2d 412 (1958); Carter v.
City Council, 180 Iowa 227, 163 N.W. 195 (1917); Campau v. Board of Pub. Works,
86 Mich. 372, 49 N.W. 39 (1891).
43. But see NEW YORK TOWN LAW § 281.
44. The New York case of In re Lake Secor Dev. Co., 141 Misc. 913, 252 N.Y.
Supp. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1931), aff'd liern., 235 App. Div. 627, 255 N.Y. Supp. 853 (1932),
illustrates the strict statutory interpretation which the majority of courts use in this
area. There, the planning board refused approval of a subdivision map on five grounds:
(1) poor location and inadequate marking of monuments; (2) insufficient park area;
(3) rights of way insufficient in width; (4) no provision for water supply; and (5)
lots of insufficient street frontage. The relevant enabling act gave the board power to
require the developer to show a park suitably located for recreational purposes and to
provide streets and highways "of sufficient width and suitable location to accommodate
the prospective traffic and to afford adequate light, air and access of fire-fighting equipment to buildings, and to be coordinated so as to compose a convenient system." NEW
YORK TOWN LAW of 1909, § 149-n. The act further provided that the "land shown on
[the map] . . . should be of such a character that it [could] . . . be used for building
purposes without danger to health." The court upheld the first three grounds for refusal
and affirmed the action of the board, but it refused to imply from the "character of the
land" provision the power to require, as conditions precedent to approval of the map,
that a water system be installed or that the lots be not less than sixty feet in width.
To cope with this literal construction, the New York Legislature then passed a statute
which specifically enumerated a large number of requirements which were prerequisites
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Only in California are courts willing to imply a power which enables municipalities to impose conditions on the approval of subdivision maps. 45 Ayres
v. City Council4" was the first case in which this was done.
Sustaining the validity of four conditions which had been attached
to a proposed map, Justice Shenk, for the majority in the Ayres case, analyzed
the provisions of the California Subdivision Map Act 47 and concluded that:
Whereas here no specific restriction or limitation on the city's power
is contained in the Charter, and none forbidding the particular conditions is included either in the Subdivision Map Act or the city
ordinances, it is proper to conclude that conditions are lawful which
are not inconsistent with the map act and the ordinances and are
reasonably required by the subdivision type and use as related to
the character
of local and neighboring planning and traffic con48
ditions .

Besides the restrictions placed by Justice Shenk on conditions attached to
approval of a subdivision map, it would seem that such conditions would also
49
be limited by the scope of the police power.
Conditions Attached to a Zoning Amendment

Perusal of a typical state zoning enabling act will reveal that there is
no express authorization for a local legislative body to attach conditions to
a zoning amendment. 50 Neither is there any language which would negate
an implication that the local legislature could impose them. Moreover, with
reference to the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, it would seem that if
conditions were incorporated into an amending ordinance, the resulting
document would constitute a zoning "regulation" 51 as much as an amending
ordinance which contained no conditions.
to approval, but gave the planning board power to waive any of them, "subject to
appropriate conditions." The current version of the statute is NEW YORK TOWN LAW
§ 277.
45. Although striking down a condition attached to approval of a subdivision map
on the ground that it was not authorized by the enabling statute, the recent case of
Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill.
2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960), suggests
that the Illinois Supreme Court may be willing to imply a power permitting local officials
to attach some conditions to approval of a subdivision map.
46. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949). For a detailed analysis of the Ayres case
see the section entitled A Disguised Exercise of the Eminent Domain or Taxing Power,
pp. 136-42 infra.
47.

CAL.

Bus. &

PROF. CODE §§

11500-625.

48. 34 Cal. 2d at 37, 207 P.2d at 5. (Emphasis added.)
49. This limitation would seem to be required by the reasoning adverted to in the
preceding section regarding variances and exceptions, pp. 112-15 supra.
50. See, e.g., NEW YORK TOWN LAW §§ 261-65; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 14754,
14756 (1957) (applicable to cities of the first class) ; Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act §§ 1-5.
51. See Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 5.
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A second requirement set forth in the standard act is that the regulations "be uniform for each class or kind of building throughout each
district. 15 2 The term "district" creates a problem of interpretation. If it
means the area encompassed by the zoning change, then probably most
amendments with conditions incorporated therein would meet the test. But
if "district" means class of district, then it would :not be Open to the legislative body to change a residential district to a business district and impose
different conditions than had been imposed on other business districts in the
municipality.5 3 Although the latter interpretation would severely limit the
use of conditions, it would not prohibit all of them.
An ordinance with conditions attached could also meet the third require'5 4
ment that the regulation be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan"
since the plan deals in general terms while the conditions have a very
specific purpose. Indeed, if a "comprehensive plan" is something other than
the existing zoning ordinances,5 5 attaching conditions to amendments may
help to achieve its long-range objectives. By requiring protective adaptations
which cannot be secured by a simple change in use classification, the local
legislative body may decrease the public opposition which often arises when
there is an attempt to bring the present zoning map more in line with the
goals set forth in the comprehensive plan.
Two other arguments may be advanced in support of the position here
taken that, absent inconsistent language in the enabling act, a power to
attach conditions to a zoning amendment should be implied in the local legislative body. First, adopting this position would help to make the law of
zoning more consistent with the law prevailing in many other areas of government regulation.5 6 In these areas it has been held that where an agency
has discretion whether or not to approve an application, as is the case when
a local legislative body is presented with an application to amend a zoning
ordinance, that agency has the power to attach conditions on the theory that
withholding approval or granting it subject to conditions are simply alter57
native methods of regulation.
52. Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 2.
53. Several decisions striking down conditions attached to zoning amendments have
adopted this meaning of the uniformity provision. See, e.g., Carole Highlands Citizens
Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 222 Md. 44, 158 A.2d 663 (1960). It has also been
used as a basis for criticizing the decisions sustaining the validity of such conditions. See
Crolly & Norton, Rezoning by Contract With Property Owners, ZONING BULLETIN: A
REVIEW OF CURRENT DECISIONS ON PLANNING AND ZONING, REGIONAL PLAN. Ass'N 2
(Sept. 1959).
54. Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 3.
55. See Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154
(1955).
56. See the cases collected in Note, supra note 37.
57. Id. at 1597.
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Second, in a state which has patterned its enabling act after a statute
like the New York Town Zoning and Planning Act, it may be contended
that since the courts have been willing to imply the power in the board of
appeals to attach conditions to a variance and since the purpose of imposing
conditions on a zoning amendment would seem to be the same as the purpose
of imposing conditions on a variance (i.e., to mitigate the inconvenience and
annoyance caused to neighboring landowners by a change in the established
land use), the courts should be equally willing to imply in the local legislative body the power to impose conditions. A counterargument would be
that since the reason for granting a variance is basically different from the
reason for amending the zoning ordinance, 58 any similarity in the purpose
of permitting imposition of conditions is not really convincing. Perhaps an
answer to this counterargument is that though from one point of view the
two devices seem quite different, from a broader perspective they seem quite
similar in that their basic objective is to achieve an effective system of landuse control. Because of this similarity in objective and because of the similarity in purpose for imposing conditions, the original argument would seem
to have considerable force.
Of course, in a jurisdiction which has modeled its state zoning enabling
act after the standard act, this argument is somewhat less persuasive because
the act specifically confers on the board of appeals the authorization to impose
conditions upon the grant of a variance, 59 but the analogy may still be drawn
between the reason for imposing conditions on a variance and the reason
for imposing conditions on an amendment. In such a jurisdiction, advocates
opposing implication of power in the local legislative body to impose conditions might contend that because the power to use conditions was
mentioned in regard to variances, it is clear that the legislature was
aware of the subject and that since that power is not mentioned in the
amendment provisions, the fair inference is that it was specifically excluded.
But in support of the contrary position it may be urged that since very broad
discretion is vested in the local legislative body, the legislature did not think
it necessary to enumerate the specific aspect of that body's power to regulate
land use, whereas, since the board of appeals is a subordinate administrative
body, it was thought necessary to enumerate the devices it might use.
Unfortunately, most courts do not reach the question whether the zoning
enabling act should be construed as authorizing a local legislative body to
impose conditions on a change in zoning, because as soon as they encounter
58. They are quite different in that a variance seeks to eliminate a personal hardship resulting from the imposition of the zoning plan in the past, while the amendment
seeks to achieve the benefits which will accrue to the whole community by attainment

of the land-use pattern suggested for the future by the comprehensive plan.
59.

Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 7.
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the word "condition" they declare the accompanying ordinance invalid as
"contract zoning." 60 To support their conclusion, they usually cite Bassett,
as follows:
Contracts have no place in a zoning plan. Zoning, if accomplished
at all, must be accomplished under the police power. It is a form of
regulation for community welfare. Contracts between property
owners or between a municipality and a property owner should
not enter into the enforcement of zoning regulations.
Sometimes local legislatures state that they will make certain zoning
changes if property owners file agreements either with one another
or with the city. This is wrong, unnecessary, and unfair. The local
legislative body is taking advantage of its superior position whenever it tries to force a property owner to enter into a contract in
order to have a permit to which he is entitled, or before zoning regulations are made which are justified by well-settled principles.
There is no consideration for taking steps in legislation. Its legislation is not and ought not to be for sale.61
It is submitted that the meaning of this statement is not clear, especially
when viewed in the context of other remarks made by the author in the
same book.6 2 To rely on the quotation without attempting to analyze it,
as the courts have done, seems a wholly inadequate way of disposing of the
"conditions" problem and tends only to confuse this area of the law.
What Bassett seems to say is that where a local legislative body bargains
away its legislative authority by promising to perform official duties in return
for promises from a property owner, the agreement is invalid for three
reasons. First, since performing an act which a party is already under a
duty to perform cannot constitute consideration 6 3 the contract lacks that
essential element. Second, even if consideration were not necessary, the
contract constitutes an improper delegation of legislative authority. 64 Finally,
the legislative body lacks the power to impose conditions requiring the
applicant to execute an agreement with the municipality or with another
property owner.
If execution of a contract were deemed consideration for the issuance
of a variance, it would seem, under Bassett's reasoning, that the contract
would be invalid on grounds of lack of consideration or improper delegation
of authority. Yet if the board had sought to accomplish its objective by the
60. The more important "contract zoning" cases are discussed at pp. 120-28 infra.
61. BASSETT, ZONING 184 (1936).

62. Id. at 128-29.
63.

See Stilk v. Myrick, 2 Camp. 317, 170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (K.B. 1809) ; RESTATE§ 76(a) (1932).
64. For several examples of improper delegation in the context of zoning see
Olson v. Town of Avon, 143 Conn. 448, 123 A.2d 279 (1956); Ballard v. Roth, 141
Misc. 319, 253 N.Y. Supp. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
MENT, CONTRACTS
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imposition of conditions attached to a variance, it is well established that the
conditions would be valid if within the scope of the police power.6 5 The
only apparent reason which justifies a different result in the two cases, other
than the difference in form, is that in the former the board presumably
refrained from exercising its discretion, while in the latter it exercised its
discretion and concluded that conditions were appropriate. It is here
contended that the important issue is not the form in which the conditions
are imposed (though, as will be discussed later, this factor has some bearing
on the outcome), but rather whether or not the board exercised its discretion in reaching a given decision.66
The application of this reasoning to the zoning amendment situation
suggests that where it can be established that the town council exercised the
discretion vested in it by the legislature, the mere fact that a condition is
attached to an ordinance should not cause that ordinance to be invalid on the
ground of lack of consideration or improper delegation of authority. The
only remaining ground which Bassett advances for invalidating conditions
attached to an amendment is that the council lacks power to impose such
restrictions, but this position was rejected in the preceding subsection.
The first major case to consider the validity of conditions attached to
a zoning amendment arose in New Jersey in 1952. The preceding year in a
dictum the New Jersey Supreme Court had quoted part of Bassett's statement, 7 and earlier in 1952, in the case of Zahodiakin Eng'r Corp. v. Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment,6" it had used the statement to justify striking down a
special exception which had been conditioned on the applicant executing and
recording a restrictive covenant with the person from whom he was
buying the property covered by the exception. Armed with the Bassett
quotation and this recent precedent in a related field, the court quickly disposed of the problem presented in Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive
Products Credit Ass'n. 9 In that case it appeared that one Byrnes had
executed and recorded an agreement with the officials of Linden, New Jersey.
In the agreement Byrnes, for himself, his heirs, his executors and assigns, promised to landscape his property and to keep all buildings a stated distance from the
road in consideration of the officials rezoning the premises. On the same day the
65. See the section entitled Conditions Attached to a Variance of Exception, pp.
112-15 supra.
66. For a case which indicates that courts should not be concerned with the motive
and promptings of a local legislative body in enacting a zoning ordinance, see Miner v.
City of Yonkers, 19 Misc. 2d 321, 189 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd mein., 9
App. Div. 2d 907, 195 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1959), appeal denied, 8 N.Y.2d 784, 168 N.E.2d
128, 201 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1960).
67. Beckmann v. Teaneck Township, 6 N.J. 530, 79 A.2d 301 (1951).
68. 8 N.J. 386. 86 A.2d 127 (1952).
69. 9 N.J. 122, 87 A.2d 319 (1952).
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agreement was executed, the zoning ordinance was amended changing Byrnes'
property to a light-industry district, but no mention was made in the
ordinance of the agreement between the applicant and the city officials.
Houston Petroleum Company and Automotive Products Credit Association
were subsequent grantees of Byrnes. Automotive Products took steps toward
building a filling station on the premises, upon a location which violated the
provisions of the restrictive covenant. Houston Petroleum petitioned the
court for an injunction to block construction, but was met with the defense
that the original agreement was invalid. The court considered the "contract"
ultra vires, citing Zahodiakin and Bassett,70 and, consequently, held for
Automotive. Although Houston Petroleum became the first major precedent
in the field, the opinion of the case did not clear up the problem whether the
term "contract" applied only to written agreements between applicants and
municipal officials or to all conditions which were not expressly set forth
in the enabling legislation and which were imposed by a local legislative
body on applicants for zoning changes, regardless of whether such conditions
were actually embodied in a formal written agreement. 71
The next major development of the law in this area occurred in the
case of Hartnett v. Austin,72 which came before the Florida Supreme Court

in 1956. The facts of the case reveal that, pursuant to an application by a
property owner, the municipality had rezoned an area from residential
to commercial to permit development of a shopping center. The ordinance in
question stated that it was subject to six conditions including execution of
"suitable contracts . . . between the city and the property owner covering

[certain] . . . requirements and also providing for control of lights on the
premises . . . . -73 Landowners in the vicinity of the rezoned tract brought
70. Id. at 129, 87 A.2d at 322.
71. An extensive article entitled Zoning by Contract, by Crolly and Norton, appeared in N.Y.L.J., April 6, 1955, p. 4. The authors generally condemned conditional
zoning amendments, but failed to discuss conditional variances, where it would have
been necessary to reconcile the "no-contracts" rule with the established principle that
conditions may be attached to a variance. Basically, the authors reiterated the reasons
which Bassett set forth for condemning conditions or "contracts." However, they suggested one additional argument which seems to warrant separate consideration, though
it may actually constitute no more than a subtle reformulation of the rule against improper delegation. They contended that an offer or agreement to comply with particular
conditions, by its very nature, prevents the "free and independent exercise of the judgment and discretion of [the] governing body," and that such offers or agreements are
therefore contrary to the community desire for a rational development of land-use regulation. This argument may be helpful in reaching a conclusion about the validity of
promises made by an applicant to induce desired action by the legislative body, but it
does not really go to the question whether the municipality should, when it deems it
necessary, be able to attach conditions to a change in zoning.
72. 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
73. Id. at 88. The "requirements," which were spelled out in the ordinance itself,
were construction of a wall not less than 40 feet inside the property line abutting
certain streets, and maintenance of the 40-foot strip in the condition prescribed by the
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suit seeking, inter alia, a determination that the described ordinance was
invalid. The court held for the plaintiff landowners, stating that it would have
upheld the ordinance if the need for the amendment had been "fairly
debatable," but that this rule was not applicable since the change had been
74
made contingent, not on need, but on the applicant fulfilling certain promises.
It is interesting to speculate how the court would have handled the case if
the municipality could have introduced evidence that there was a great need
for the change and that the conditions had been imposed for the protection of
neighboring landowners.
The Hartnett opinion suggested a new argument against the use of
contracts in zoning, specifically, that the zoning ordinance should be a
document complete in itself-one whose scope and meaning could be determined without reference to extrinsic agreements. 75 The contention has
considerable force, but is directed toward undisclosed agreements rather
than against contracts per se. Thus it would not seem to apply if the full
agreement between a municipality and a property owner were set forth
in the amending ordinance.
Still a further argument for the "no-contract" rule is suggested in
Baylis v. City of Baltimore,76 the third major case in this area, where the
court stated that "a municipality is not able to make agreements which
inhibit its police powers. ' 77 The previously discussed arguments regarding
improper delegation and interference with judgment would seem to be em-bodied in this statement, but it also contains an element of estoppel. It seems
to suggest that if a municipality required an applicant for a zoning amendment to execute a contract embodying given conditions, the municipality
would not be free to vary the terms of the contract.7 8 But if, as has been
city commission at the expense of the property owner. The rest of the six conditions
were the furnishing, at the property owner's expense, of adequate police protection
within the rezoned areas, submission of plans to the city commission for approval, and
limited access to certain abutting streets.
74. Id. at 89.
75. Id. at 88. The policy against unfair surprise underlies the court's reasoning
on this point. This policy is also discussed in the Vagueness section, pp. 129-30 infra.
76. 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959). The facts of the case were as follows: the
Baltimore City Council had rezoned the applicant's lot from a residential use district
to a commercial use district, subject to conditions which were stated in the ordinance
requiring, among other things, that a contract be executed and recorded, and that the
premises be used only as a funeral home. The adjoining landowners brought suit seeking a declaration that the zoning amendment was invalid and an injunction restraining
the applicant from carrying on his undertaking business. The fact that only one property
was rezoned and that the permitted use was far more restricted than the other commexcial districts suggests that the proper analysis of this case was that it was not in accordance with the comprehensive plan and therefore constituted illegal "spot zoning." But
the court de-emphasized this approach and relied on the "no-contract-zoning" rule to
invalidate the ordinance.
77. Id. at 170, 148 A.2d at 433. (Emphasis added.)
78. For an elaboration of this argument see Crolly & Norton, supra note 53.
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previously suggested, a condition is part of the zoning regulations, the established rule that a municipal zoning regulation is not a contract and may be
changed would seem to be applicable. 79 The problem arises whether the rule
is applicable when, besides stating conditions in an ordinance, the local
legislative body has the applicant sign a paper in which he agrees to comply
with them. Since the enforcement procedure set forth in the zoning ordinances
could be used to secure compliance without regard to the presence of the
contract,80 it might well be contended that the existence of the contract is
superfluous and thus there is no reason to abandon the established rule,
even when a separate written agreement is present8s
The most recent case in this area is Church v. Town of Islip,s 2 decided

in New York in 1960. The procedural context of that case was basically the
same as that of the Hartnett83 and Baylis8 4 cases, in that adjoining landowners sought invalidation of a zoning amendment which reclassified only
the applicant's property from a residence use to a business use. The ordinance
in question stated that the rezoning was to be conditioned upon compliance
with four conditions and the execution and recording .of restrictive covenants
as to maximum area to be occupied by buildings and as to erection of a fence
and planting of shrubbery. The special referee who tried the case inspected
the premises at the request of counsel for both sides. He concluded that the
amendment constituted illegal "spot zoning" and that the imposition of
conditions by the town board was illegal "contract zoning."s
79. Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315 (1932). Furthermore, a municipality may
not be estopped to revoke an invalid building permit, Lipsitz v. Porr, 164 Md. 222, 164
Atl. 743 (1933), or to deny the validity of an invalid contract, Williams v. City of
Fargo, 63 N.D. 183, 247 N.W. 46 (1933).
80. See, e.g., NEW YORK TOWN LAW § 268 (providing for fines up to $50 and
imprisonment up to six months).
81. Maryland cases subsequent to Baylis have reaffirmed the prohibition of conditional zoning amendments. See Carole Highlands Citizens Ass'n v. Board of County
Comm'rs, supra note 53; Rose v. Paape, 221 Md. 369, 157 A.2d 618 (1960). But the
case of Pressman v. City of Baltimore, 222 Md. 330, 160 A.2d 379 (1960), suggests a
way in which the prohibition may be avoided. In that case the Baltimore Planning
Commission, to which a proposed zoning amendment had been referred, agreed to
recommend approval of the amendment to the City Council of Baltimore if the applicant
agreed to comply with certain conditions. Although not bound by the report of the Planning Commission, the Council approved the amendment with knowledge of the applicant's
agreement with the Planning Commission, but without mentioning the agreement or the
conditions in the amending ordinance. When the amendment was challenged, it was
upheld with the court distinguishing Baylis, Rose, and Carole Highlands. Query, how
the Maryland courts would decide a suit by the Planning Commission to enforce the
agreement it entered into with the applicant in the Pressman case. In this regard see
Board of Educ. v. Herzog Constr. Co., 29 Ill. App. 2d 138, 172 N.E.2d 645 (1961).
82. 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960).
83. Supra note 72.
84. Supra note 76.
85. Church v. Town of Islip, 6 Misc. 2d 810, 813, 160 N.Y.S.2d 45, 48-49 (Sup. Ct.
1956).
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On appeal, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reversed the
referee86 and upheld the ordinance, taking judicial notice of the growth and
development of surrounding counties and "of practical problems presented to
local legislative bodies by a deluge of applications for zoning district changes
which are prompted by the necessities of such growth .. -7
".. After stating
that the evidence supported such notice and remarking that the practice of
imposing conditions seems to have been widespread, the court concluded
that the practice was not "contrary to the spirit of zoning ordinances [or]
. . . beyond the statutory powers of local legislative bodies,"

88

and, conse-

quently, held for the defendants. Following entry of judgment, the plaintiff
appealed, but the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the appellate
division.89
In the Baylis case the court stated that it presumed the original zoning
ordinance was intended to be permanent and that any amendment would be
sustained only if there were proof of original mistake or change of circumstances. 90 The use of this presumption placed a heavy burden on the municipality to justify its action. In the Hartnett case the court used a slightly
different standard which seemed to place less burden on the municipality.
The officials were required to show only that the need for the amendment
was "fairly debatable." 91 Although in Baylis and Hartnett the proponents of
the amendments failed to prove the facts necessary to discharge their burden
of proof, if the standard used in either of the two cases had been applied in
the Church case, on the basis of the judicial notice taken by the appellate
division 92 and statements made in the course of the court of appeals opinion,9 3
there can be little doubt that there was an adequate showing of changed
circumstances. But in the Church case the court of appeals started with
a different premise, that is, that the municipal action must be accorded the
"strongest possible presumption of validity and must stand if there is any
factual basis therefor." 94 Perhaps this presumption, coupled with the changing character of the neighborhood, was sufficient to overcome the "spot
86. Church v. Town of Islip, 8 App. Div. 2d 962, 190 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1959).
87. Id. at 963, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 929-30.
88. Id. at 963, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
89. Church v. Town of Islip, supra note 82. The vote of the court was five to two
with Justices Froessel and Voorhis dissenting.
90. 219 Md. at 169, 148 A.2d at 432.
91. 93 So. 2d at 89.
92. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
93. The court of appeals agreed with the appellate division's findings of fact, and
stated: "It is undisputed that Bay Shore Road has become a busy arterial highway ....
On the issue of arbitrariness, there was reliable testimony that all of Bay Shore Road
would be eventually zoned for business and that this trend would not be stopped ... "
8 N.Y.2d at 258-59, 168 N.E.2d at 682, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
94. Ibid.
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zoning" argument which was based on the fact that only the applicant's
property was involved in the change of zoning.95 At any rate, the court had
little to say on this point.
There seem to be three aspects to that section of the court of appeals opinion which deals with the conditions issue. First, the court seems to have been
willing to imply the power to impose conditions, stating that "since the
Town Board could have, presumably, zoned this Bay Shore Road corner
for business without any restrictions, we fail to see how reasonable conditions
invalidate the legislation.119 6 This statement would seem to be a modification
of the "privilege" argument, which so often has been used to justify imposition of conditions.9 7 In other areas of administrative law, one factor which
courts have considered when determining whether an agency has been given
a particular power is how the agency itself has construed its authority.98 One
reason for giving weight to this factor is that the statute is primarily addressed
to the administrator, who, because of his expertness in the given field and
his continuing responsibility for the administration of the entire statutory
scheme, may attach a slightly different meaning to the words than would a
court. 9 The court of appeals, in reaching its decision, may well have
considered this factor and may have given it considerable weight in view of
the fact, noted by the appellate division, 1°° that many similarly situated local
officials in New York were in the practice of attaching conditions to
zoning amendments.
Second, there is a suggestion in the court of appeals opinion that neither
the applicants nor the neighboring landowners could challenge the conditions
in question.101 Support for the court's position that the applicants were barred
because they had "accepted"' 10 2 the conditions may be found in those cases
which hold that where applicants receive benefits accruing from a change in
95. For clear analysis in cases dealing with conditional zoning amendments, the
question whether the amendment constitutes "spot zoning" should be carefully distinguished from the question whether the attached conditions are invalid.
It may be that some of the cases which have condemned the use of conditions could
equally well have been decided on the basis that the amendment in question was not in
accordance with the "comprehensive plan" and consequently constituted "spot zoning."
See Hartnett v. Austin, supra note 72; Baylis v. City of Baltimore, supra note 76. However, this latter basis may not have been used because of the difficult balancing of considerations required to resolve a "spot zoning" problem compared with the ease of applying Bassett's absolute prohibition of "contract zoning."
96. 8 N.Y.2d at 259, 168 N.E.2d at 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
97. See pp. 110-11, 114 supra.
98. See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936).
99.

HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS

1320-23 (tent. ed. 1958).

100. 8 App. Div. 2d at 963, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
101. 8 N.Y.2d at 259, 168 N.E.2d at 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
102. It is unclear in the opinion whether the act of acceptance was the receipt of
substantial benefits accruing from the change in land use or the mere execution of a
formal agreement to comply with the conditions.
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land use, they will be bound by their voluntary agreement to accept designated
burdens.103 But that portion of the suggestion which relates to the neighboring
landowners is much less tenable. In implying that the neighbors could not
contest the conditions because such were designed for their benefit, 10 4 the
court appears to focus only on the effect of the conditions and to disregard
the effect of the use reclassification. This approach seems artificial since
the actual significance of benefits accruing from imposed conditions can be
determined only when such benefits are weighed against the burdens produced by the reclassification to which such conditions were attached. Even
if the proposition be accepted that persons should not be able to contest
municipal action which is beneficial to them, it should nevertheless be open
to them to show, by analyzing the overall effect of a transaction, that it
does not in fact constitute a benefit. It should also be open to a person
aggrieved by a zoning change 1 5 to argue that the municipality lacked power
to attach conditions to the amendment in question and that if the conditions
are invalidated, the amendment should fall because it would be unreasonable
to assume that the local legislative body would have approved the amendment
without the conditions. In addition to allowing neighboring landowners to use
every available argument to protect the value of their property, permitting
them to contest conditions would also help to prevent ultra vires action by
a municipality, 1 6 whereas a contrary rule might well encourage such action.
The last phase of the court of appeals opinion represents the first attempt
by a court to avoid the "no-contract-zoning" doctrine, while giving weight
to the considerations underlying it. After noting that the meaning of "contract
zoning" was not clear, the court stated:
All legislation "by contract" is invalid in the sense that a Legislature
cannot bargain away or sell its powers. But we deal here with
actualities not phrases. To meet increasing needs of Suffolk County's
own population explosion, and at the same time, to make as gradual
and as little of an annoyance as possible the change from residence to
business on the main highways, the Town Board imposes conditions.
There is nothing unconstitutional about it.Y°7
103. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Herzog Constr. Co., supra note 81. But cf. Purtill v.
Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 146 Conn. 570, 153 A.2d 441 (1959); Vlahos Realty
Co. v. Little Boar's Head Dist., 101 N.H. 460, 146 A.2d 257 (1958). Compare Ricciardi
v. Los Angeles County, 115 Cal. App. 2d 569, 252 P.2d 773 (1953), with Edmonds v.
Los Angeles County, 40 Cal. 2d 642, 255 P.2d 772 (1953).
104. This argument had previously been used by a New York Supreme Court in
the case of Titus St. Paul Property Owners Ass'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 205
Misc. 1083, 132 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
105. For a discussion of the rights of persons aggrieved by zoning changes see
Foss, Interested Third Parties in Zoning, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 16 (1959).
106.

For a case which states that even if the action of a municipality is ultra vires,

third parties have no standing to contest such action, see Colt v. Bernard, 279 S.W.2d
527, 531 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955).
107. 8 N.Y.2d at 259, 168 N.E.2d at 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
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This statement seems to suggest that, by imposing conditions, the local
legislative body may be trying to protect landowners in the vicinity of the
zoning change, rather than bargain away its discretion. The force of this
argument would seem to be increased by the court's finding that the record
did not indicate an agreement in the sense that the owners made an offer
1° 8
accepted by the board.
In a jurisdiction which uses the previously discussed presumption of
permanency or "fairly debatable" standard to assess the validity of a
zoning amendment, the Church case might be distinguished from the Baylis
and Hartnett cases on the ground that in Church there were indications of
changed circumstances which were not shown to exist in the other two cases
and that consequently it was proper to sustain the conditional amendments
in Church and to invalidate them in Baylis and Hartnett. The Church case
might also be distinguished from the Houston Petroleum case on the ground
that in the former the conditions were fully set forth in the ordinance while
in the latter a clandestine agreement was involved. But aside from these
superficial distinctions, the rationale of the Church case is fundamentally
inconsistent with the rationale of these other cases.
It is submitted that the New York case represents the better approach.
Although the court of appeals did not carefully separate its reasons for
upholding the conditions, and although it would have been wise to have
omitted the remark about the neighboring landowners being unable to contest
the action of the town board, the court did reach a rationally justifiable and
expedient result by implying a power in the local legislative body to attach
conditions to a change in zoning.1° Moreover, in refraining from applying the
108. Ibid.
109. Criticizing the result in the Church case, the editors of the ZONING BULLETIN
stated :
The majority decision of the Court . . . appears to us not to be correct ...
The Court held that a Town Board has the implied power under the zoning
enabling act, to resort to so-called "contract rezoning." The Legislature itself
has, in effect, construed Section 265 of the Town Law as not conferring such
power on Town Boards. At the 1956 Session of the New York Legislature a bill
was introduced to amend § 265 of the Town Law to empower the Town Board
to "* * * make such order, requirements, agreement or conditions as in its
opinion ought to be made in the premises, and require the same to be recorded
in like manner as a deed to real property." While this bill passed both Houses
of the Legislature it was vetoed by Governor Harriman, who said: "This bill
would upset the orderly process for zoning regulation. A privately drawn agreement which affects the rights of the community, may readily grant a special
Privilege and thereby violate the due process clause of the State Constitution.
The objections voiced by the State Comptroller, the Association of Towns, the
Westchester County Board of Supervisors and the Regional Plan Association
require disapproval. The bill is disapproved." The Court in the case under discussion, therefore, found an implied power which our legislature and executive
branches by recent actions clearly deemed not to exist.
Crolly & Norton, Rezoning by Contract With Property Owners, ZONING BULLETIN: A
REVIEW OF CURRENT DECISIONS ON

(Sept. 1959).

PLANNING AND ZONING,
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"no-contract-zoning" doctrine when presented with a conditions problem and
in suggesting that attention be focused on the question whether the local
legislative body in fact exercised its discretion when arriving at its decision," 0
the court pointed out a method of analysis which other courts might do well
to adopt."'
One final comment should be made on the subject of conditions attached
to a zoning amendment. It would seem that the reluctance of some courts to
uphold such conditions is in part based on a fear that no inherent restrictions
could be placed on them." 2 In the Church opinion the court of appeals implied that such conditions would have to meet a reasonableness test. 11 But
since the scope of zoning regulation is limited by the police power,"114 and
since, as has been previously suggested, conditions constitute regulation,"
it would seem that the scope of permissible conditions should also be limited
by that same power. Such a limitation, it has been asserted, would be
slightly more restrictive than a standard of reasonableness, in that, even
though reasonable, conditions relating solely to aesthetics would not be
permissible." 6
FACTORS THE COURTS

SEEM To

CONSIDER WHEN

DEFINING THE

SCOPE

OF THE POLICE POWER

Throughout the first part of this Article it was contended that, whether
expressly stated in a statute or imposed by municipal officials under a broad
grant of power, a condition attached to a change in land use is valid only if
within the scope of the police power. Of course, even if a local official has
the power to impose conditions, a given condition may be invalid for other
reasons than that it is beyond the scope of that power. For example, courts
invalidate conditions if they are superfluous, that is, if they add nothing to
The position of the governor seems clear, but it is a considerable over-simplification
to say that the passing of the bill by both houses clearly indicated that the legislature
deemed the implied power not to exist. The passing of the bill could equally well indicate that the legislators desired to make explicit the power which they thought was
implied in the original zoning enabling act in an effort to encourage local officials to
make greater use of conditions.
110. On the question whether the local legislative body has exercised its discretion,
the burden of proof might well be placed on the person seeking to invalidate the
municipal action, thereby freeing local officials from undue concern over how to prove
that they are properly carrying out their duties.
111. Although the issue was not presented by the Church case, it would be wise
to require that all conditions be set forth in the zoning amendment so that the zoning
ordinance may be preserved as an integrated document.
112. See Baylis v. City of Baltimore, supra note 76.
113. 8 N.Y.2d at 259, 168 N.E.2d at 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
114. Mansfield & Swett v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 Atl. 225
(Sup. Ct. 1938) ; YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 15 (2d ed. 1953).
115. See pp. 114-15 supra.
116. See BASSETT, ZONING 129 (1936).
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the legal duty of the applicant ;117 if they conflict with express provisions of
the zoning ordinance or state enabling act;118 or if they are imposed to
mitigate the effects of a change in land use made in disregard of the statutory standard for decision." 9
It is the purpose of this part to try to make more specific what is meant
by the phrase "within the police power." The developing case law is examined
in an effort to discover what factors the courts consider when deciding given
cases. In several instances it is contended that a court has improperly
analyzed a problem, and an effort is made to justify a different solution.
Unfortunately, many of the opinions dealing with the validity of conditions
contain only the statement of a result. Thus it may seem somewhat unrealistic to say that a particular factor influenced the outcome of a case when
the court in question made no reference to it, but such a tactic seemed to
be required if what appear to be inconsistent decisions were to be reconciled.
Vagueness
In the area of land-use controls, to say that action by a municipality is
"within the police power" seems to be merely a statement of the result
that, on the particular facts presented, the interests of the public outweigh
the interests of private landowners affected by the action. Because failure to
comply with an imposed condition may cause revocation of a permit 20 or
commencement of court proceedings,1 2 1 and because the landowner on whom
the condition has been imposed should receive fair warning when he fails
to comply, where the meaning of a condition is so unclear that he is deprived
of that warning, courts might well strike down that condition on the ground
that it is not within the police power since the strong interests of the land122
owner outweigh the public interest involved. Pearson v. Shoemaker
represents a decision where considerable weight may have been given to the
fair-warning requirement. The facts of the case show that the applicant had
been granted permission to build a community recreation center and swimming
pool subject to the conditions, among others, that membership be limited to
150 persons and that preference for membership be given to nearby residents.
When petitioned to determine the validity of the conditions, the court
123
struck down the preference requirement on the ground that it was vague.
117. See Fey v. Woermann, 360 Mo. 728, 230 S.W.2d 681 (1950).
118. See Gordon v. Zoning Bd., 145 Conn. 597, 145 A.2d 746 (1958) ; Stiriz v.
Stout, 210 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1960). See also Belle-Haven Citizens Ass'n v.
Schumann, 201 Va. 36, 109 S.E.2d 139 (1959) (dictum).
119. See Berdan v. City of Paterson, 1 N.J. 199, 62 A.2d 680 (1948).
120. See Guardian Garage v. Dorman, 233 App. Div. 771, 250 N.Y. Supp. 861
(1931).
121. See North Plainfield v. Perone, 54 N.J. Super. 1, 148 A.2d 50 (1959), cert.
denied, 29 N.J. 507, 150 A.2d 292 (1959).
122. 25 Misc. 2d 591, 202 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
123. Id. at 593, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 781.
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However, the term "vague" is not always an abbreviation for a statement
of the policy against unfair surprise. This is suggested by the case of Taft
v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 124 where a variance was granted permitting
conversion of a storage shed into a house, subject to the condition "that a
safeguard, satisfactory to the building inspector, shall be attached to the
building in such a manner as to prevent rain or snow from overflowing onto
adjacent property.' 1 2 5 Stating that the condition was too vague, the court
modified it, requiring the corners of the shed to be not less than a stated
distance from the property line. Perhaps the reason for the decision was a
desire on the part of the court to prevent protracted negotiations and required
changes in specifications which might result when the local official is not
1 26
guided by a legislatively prescribed standard.
Conditions Related to Health and Safety
If a condition is closely related to promoting public health, it is upheld.
Hence, to a permit which authorizes enlargement of an eating establishment,
a municipality may validly attach a condition requiring maintenance of
toilet facilities for patrons, 127 or to an exception which authorizes operation
of a "laundramat," it may attach a condition limiting the number of automatic washing machines in accordance with the capacity of the sewage disposal system.128 An equally valid condition is one which is closely related
to promoting public safety, as where access to property is restricted to improve
the flow of traffic . 29 A requirement that a parking lot be covered with a
hard surface might be justified as a safety measure in that it will reduce
the likelihood of people falling on loose stones.' 0 A condition restricting
parking on the premises, however, might be invalidated on the ground that
it tends to reduce safety by increasing congestion in the streets.' 3 ' The cases
seem to make a distinction between parking and storing automobiles so that
although a parking restriction is often invalid,' 3 2 a condition prohibiting
33
storage of cars on the outside of a building is upheld.'
Requirements that an applicant build a fence13 4 or plant trees' 3 5 or
124. 76 R.I. 443, 71 A.2d 886 (1950).
125. Id. at 446, 71 A.2d at 888.
126. See Knutson v. State ex rel. Seberger, 160 N.E.2d 200, 202 (Ind. 1959).
127. Vlahos Realty Co. v. Little Boar's Head Dist., supra note 103.
128. E.g., DeVille Homes v. Michaelis, 201 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
129. E.g., Fifty-Fourth St. Center v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 395 Pa. 338, 150
A.2d 335 (1959) ; Fiske v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 70 R.I. 426, 40 A.2d 435 (1944).
130. Cf. Everson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 395 Pa. 168, 149 A.2d 63 (1959)
Springfield Township v. Flourbowl, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 28 (C.P. 1956).
131. See Service Realty Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 141 Conn.
632, 109 A.2d 256 (1954).
132. See ibid.
133. See North Plainfield v.Perone, supra note 121.
134. See Vlahos Realty Co. v.Little Boar's Head Dist., supra note 103.
135. See Ayres v.City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
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hedges 136 have also been upheld. It seems more difficult to justify these conditions on the ground that they are related to the public health or safety;
however, it may be argued that erection of the fence will serve to keep
people off the premises, thereby reducing the risk of injury created by a
dangerous activity being conducted thereon. 137 Where the property abuts a
major highway, a hedge or fence or thick buffer of trees may so limit access
to the road as to promote safety by forcing people to cross only at designated
places.' 38 It would seem that a row of trees or a hedge might reduce noise,
dust, and glare passing from one property to the next and for this reason
139
might be justified as promoting public health or safety.
In some of the cases dealing with shopping centers or eating establishments, the land-use permit has been conditioned on the construction of lighting facilities which will not throw a glare on neighboring property. 140 Besides mitigating the annoyance and inconvenience which the neighbors may
have to undergo because of having a business next to their property, such
a condition, if there is a road nearby, may have a very direct relation to
safety by making it easier for drivers to see. Generally, such conditions have
been held to be within the scope of the police power.
Where an analogy may be drawn between a condition and a wellrecognized type of land-use control, the condition is usually upheld. Thus
courts have sustained the validity of conditions which limit the area on
which a building may be constructed, 141 which restrict the height of a build44
ing, 42 or which impose a set-back 143 or off-street parking requirement.
Regulation of
In three
it was argued
of a full-time

Business Operations
recent cases which dealt with coin-operated laundramats, 145
that if the use permits were not conditioned on the presence
attendant, there was great danger that neighborhood children

136. See Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d
866 (1960).
137. Consider the fact situation in Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal. App. 2d 348, 203
P.2d 37 (1949), where an excavation permit was conditioned, inter alia, on the applicant
constructing a six-foot, mesh wire fence around the area to be excavated.
138. See Ayres v. City Council, supra note 135.
139. See ibid.; Everson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, supra note 130.
140. See Fifty-Fourth St. Center v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, supra note 129;
Vlahos Realty Co. v. Little Boar's Head Dist., supra note 103.
141. See Vasilakis v. City of Haverhill, 339 Mass. 97, 157 N.E.2d 871 (1959)
Church v. Town of Islip, supra note 136.
142. See Smith v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 54 R.I. 88, 170 At. 74 (1934).
143. See Wheeler v. Gregg, supra note 137 (sustaining the condition by implication).
144. See McLain v. Planning Comm'n, 156 Cal. App. 2d 161, 319 P.2d 24 (1957).
145. DeVille Homes v. Michaelis, supra note 128; State ex rel. Superior Corp. v.
City of East Cleveland, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 177, 158 N.E.2d 565 (Ct. App. 1959) ; Van
Sciver v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 396 Pa. 646, 152 A.2d 717 (1959).
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might crawl into the machines and be injured. Other advocates of conditional
permits contended that the presence of an attendant was necessary to prevent these establishments from becoming hangouts for juvenile delinquents.
Despite these tenable positions, in two of the three cases the courts invalidated
the full-time-attendant condition on the ground that it was not within the
scope of the police power. 146 Perhaps these two decisions were based on the
unarticulated theory that the concept of land-use control does not include
regulation of the day-to-day operation of a business.
But on the basis of cases which have upheld conditions requiring garage
and service station operators to make automobile repairs only inside their
buildings, 147 or requiring businesses to store automobiles or materials only
inside buildings,'148 it could be argued that this day-to-day operation
concept is without merit. A counterargument would seem to be that telling
a businessman which portion of his property he may use to conduct a given
activity is more closely akin to the standard conception of land-use control
than telling him to use additional men to operate his business. However,
it should be noted that the counterargument implicitly concedes that the
enumerated conditions affect business operations, and it makes the distinction turn on another factor, i.e., the degree to which the condition differs
from the standard conception of land-use regulation. Thus, although the
enumerated decisions do not show that the business-operation concept is
without merit, they do suggest that it is not sufficient to inquire whether the
condition pertains to operations, but that it is also necessary to show that the
effect is different from that of the standard types of land-use controls.
This two-step approach may be used to explain the result in the case
of Houlden's Appeal,149 where the Croatian Fraternal Union of America
was granted a permit to erect a one-story building addition subject to the
condition that the printing presses which were to be installed in the addition
should be "used only for the printing of the official organ or publication of
the . . . Union

. . .

or other paper or pamphlets of said union, and that

no commercial printing be done on the premises."'u 0 The court's decision
sustaining the validity of the condition seems justified because, though
the condition certainly affected the daily operations in restricting the type
of matter which could be printed, the effect was only that produced by
application of the well-recognized zoning distinction between commercial
and noncommercial uses.
146. DeVille Homes v. Michaelis, supra note 128; Van Sciver v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, supra.
147. E.g., North Plainfield v. Perone, supra note 121.
148. E.g., ibid.; Everson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, supra note 130.
149. 86 Pitt. L.J. 115 (Pa. C.P. 1937).
150. Id. at 116.
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Even if a condition pertains to business operations and even if the effect
is unlike that produced by the statutory methods of land-use control, there
are two cases which seem to indicate that the validity of the condition may
still be sustained. In the earlier one a Pennsylvania court upheld a condition
requiring the applicant to use a gas burner in his dry-cleaning business
instead of a coal burner which he wanted to use and which most of his
competitors were using. 1 1 In the other case a New Hampshire court upheld
a conditional variance renewal which contained a condition requiring the
applicant, who was the owner of an ice cream stand, to sell only the same
products as had been sold by his predecessor in title. 1 52 Although at first
glance these cases, sustaining regulation of business operations, seem inconsistent with the laundramat cases which struck down such regulation, the
facts reveal that the former cases dealt with regulation of businesses which
began as nonconforming uses, while the latter did not. Since such uses exist
because they were present before the adoption of a zoning ordinance 55 and
since they hamper achievement of the ultimate objectives of zoning,15 4 there
would seem to be a greater public interest in restricting them than in restricting
uses which come into existence only after local officials have exercised their
discretion and have concluded that there are adequate reasons for deviating
from the established pattern of land use. This greater public interest in
restricting nonconforming uses might justify sustaining the validity of a
given condition which would be invalid but for the presence of such use.
On the basis of this argument the two cases described above seem reconcilable
with the laundramat cases.
Personal Licenses
Brief mention should be made of conditions which state that a land-use
permit will terminate when the applicant sells the premises. Like conditions
which affect day-to-day business operations, they are treated as being unrelated to "land use." They have been uniformly invalidated on the ground
that they are mere personal licenses. 15 5 Another reason offered for striking
them down is that they constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
A problem which runs throughout the whole area of conditions is clearly
pointed up by the cases dealing with these "personal conditions." If the
applicant for the land-use permit secures a determination that a condition
151. Appeal of Consol. Cleaning Shops, 103 Pa. Super. 66, 157 Atl. 811 (1931).
152. Vlahos Realty Co. v. Little Boar's Head Dist., supra note 103.
153. See Note: Nonconforming Uses: A Rationale and an Approach, 102 U. PA.
L. REv. 91 (1953).
154. See Bartholomew, Nonconforming Uses Destroy the Neighborhood, 15 J.
LAND & P.U. EcoN. 96 (1939).
155. See, e.g., Vlahos Realty Co. v. Little Boar's Head Dist:, 101 N.H. 460, 146
A.2d 257 (1958).
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is invalid, the court will excise the condition and allow the unconditional
permit to stand.156 However, if an adjoining landowner obtains a similar
determination, the whole permit will be invalidated. 157 The existence of
these two results has the undesirable effect of encouraging a race to the
courthouse whenever a condition of questionable validity is imposed. A
solution to this problem may lie in an application of a severability rule, 58
or in the suggestion that the court try to determine whether the municipality
would have issued the permit without the condition' 59 or whether it would
have been reasonable for the municipality to have issued the permit without
the condition.
Aesthetic Conditions
Reps, in his article on conditional variances and exceptions, 160 cites the
case of Soho Park & Land Co. v. Board of Adjustment"" to support the
proposition that aesthetic conditions may not be imposed. Of the conditions
invalidated in that case, the two which the court thought had been imposed
for "aesthetic reasons" were the requirements that the applicant plant trees
on one side of the property and that he build only brick buildings with stone
trim. Both conditions were worded so that approval of the type and number
of trees and approval of the building plans had to be secured from the
building inspector, and it may be that this approval feature, as noted previously, 16 2 may have had some bearing on the court's decision. Also,
since the 1927 New Jersey constitutional amendment16 3 authorizing the
use of zoning had only been in effect a short time before the case
arose, it may be that the decision merely illustrates a carry-over of
64
the judicial hostility which had created the need for that amendment.
However, the court did use the term "aesthetic," and thus the case would
seem to support the proposition for which it was cited.
Reps went on to say that the validity of aesthetic conditions was sustained in Selligman v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 16 5 where a garage
156. See, e.g., Soho Park & Land Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 6 N.J. Misc. 686,
142 Atl. 548 (Sup. Ct. 1928). See also Fernald Appeal, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 291 (C.P.
1958) (also bearing on the question of standing to sue).
157. See, e.g., Olevson v. Zoning Bd., 71 R.I. 303, 44 A.2d 720 (1945).
158. See ibid., where this approach is suggested.
159. See Town of Greenburgh v. Buser, 4 Misc. 2d 513, 148 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup.
Ct. 1955).
160. Reps, Legal and Administrative Aspects of Conditional Zoning Variances and
Exceptions, 2 SYRACUSE L. REv. 54 (1950).
161. Supra note 156.
162. See the section entitled Vagueness, pp. 129-30 supra.
163. The amendment was incorporated in the New Jersey Constitution of 1947,

art. 4, § 6, f"2.
164. See BASSETT, ZONING 15 n.3 (1936).
165. 277 Ky. 551, 126 S.W.2d 419 (1939).
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was required to be built so as to conform architecturally with a building
to which it was to be attached. But the court in that case proceeded on the
assumption that conditions need not be limited to the scope of the police
power, 166 and this assumption has previously been rejected.
Perhaps aesthetic considerations should be within the police power, but
this question is beyond the scope of this paper. The general rule seems to be
that they are not, 167 and hence conditions which are primarily based on them
are invalid. Conditions requiring the erection of a fence or the planting of a
hedge or a buffer of trees are certainly motivated in part by aesthetic
considerations, but perhaps the courts have been justified in upholding such
conditions because of the public health and safety arguments which can be
made to support them. There have been few recent cases dealing with
"aesthetic" conditions, but several cases have set forth such conditions in
their facts, 68 and it may be that although the validity of the conditions was
not, in fact, passed upon, these cases may be cited in the future for the
proposition that such conditions are valid.' 6 9
A Reasonable Relation to the Problem Sought To Be Eliminated
The case of Pearson v. Shoemaker, 70 discussed in the Vagueness
section, and one of the coin-operated laundramat cases, Van Sciver v. Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment,' 7 ' illustrate another factor which the courts consider when
appraising the validity of a given condition. It will be remembered that in
166. Id. at 560-61, 126 S.W.2d at 424.
167. But cf. State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262,
69 N.W.2d 217 (1955).
168. See, e.g., Riverside St. Clair Corp. v. Walsh, 131 Misc. 652, 228 N.Y. Supp.
88 (Sup. Ct. 1928), aff'd mer., 225 App. Div. 655, 231 N.Y. Supp. 869 (1928).
169. Three Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases aptly illustrate the stated proposition. In Novello v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 384 Pa. 294, 121 A.2d 91 (1956), the
issue was whether a conditional use permit authorizing erection of a car wash should
have been issued. Although the conditions attached to this permit were set forth in the
statement of facts, the court did not discuss them. Two years later, in Nicholson v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 392 Pa. 278, 140 A.2d 604 (1958), the court held that a
permit authorizing use of a lot in a residence district for business parking should be
upheld against attack by adjoining landowners. In a dictum the court described conditions which had been imposed on the applicant for the permit and said that these were
designed to limit the objections to the change in land use. But again there was no discussion as to the validity of the conditions. In Fifty-Fourth St. Center v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment, supra note 129, the court was finally faced with the question whether six
conditions attached to a use permit were valid. Citing Nicholson and Novello for the
proposition that the validity of such conditions was well-established, the court dismissed
the case.
If other courts use a similar approach, a number of cases might be cited as establishing the validity of conditions, although they actually do little more than enumerate
the imposed conditions. See, e.g., St. Patrick's Church Corp. v. Daniels, 113 Conn. 132,
154 At. 343 (1931) ; Sarber Realty Corp. v. Silver, 205 N.Y.S.2d 30 (Sup. Ct. 1960)
Morris v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 52 R.I. 26, 155 AtI. 654 (1931).
170. 25 Misc. 2d 591, 202 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1960).

171. Supra note 145.
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Pearson the permit to build a swimming pool restricted membership to
150 persons. The court felt that this condition was imposed to limit the noise
and traffic which would result from the operation of the pool. But since no
restriction was placed on the number of guests which each member could
bring, the court stated that the condition was ineffective to eliminate these
problems and was therefore invalid. Likewise in the Van Sciver case, where
the permit had been issued subject to the condition that the establishment be
closed on Sundays and evenings, the court invalidated the condition, reasoning
that since juvenile delinquents could congregate in these places when they
were open, the hour limitations would not be effective to prevent these
establishments from becoming hangouts.
Of the two cases, Van Sciver seems the more difficult to justify. Whereas the condition in the Pearson case may have had very little tendency to
reduce noise or traffic, the condition in Van Sciver greatly reduced the number
of hours during which the laundramats could be used as meeting places,
particularly in view of the fact that the reduction affected those hours when
youths would not be in school or at work and would have time to congregate.
Perhaps to justify the Van Sciver result it is necessary to go beyond what
the court said and to give some weight to the fact that the condition dealt
with the regulation of business operations. But even with this added factor
taken into consideration, the decision is not altogether satisfying.
A Disguised Exercise of the Eminent Domain or Taxing Power
In a previous section of this paper, 172 Ayres v. City Council173 was cited
to illustrate the willingness of some courts to imply a broad power to impose
conditions. The case is also considered at this point because it deals with the
validity of some important conditions which local administrators have been
imposing as a means of controlling subdivision development. The facts of'
the case are that the plaintiff, Ayres, sought approval to subdivide a triangular,
thirteen-acre tract in the Westchester District of the City of Los Angeles.
The municipal planning commission recommended to the city council that:
the proposed map be approved subject to four conditions: (1) that the applicant dedicate an eighty-foot strip across his tract as a right of way for the
extension of a local street; (2) that he dedicate a ten-foot strip along the
boulevard which bordered one side of his property for use in widening that:
thoroughfare; (3) that another ten-foot strip along the boulevard be
restricted to the planting of trees and shrubbery for the purpose of preventing
ingress and egress between the proposed lots and that highway; and (4)
that he dedicate a small triangle of land at one tip of his property so that
172. See the section entitled Conditions on the Approval of Subdivision Maps,
pp. 115-16 supra.
173. Supra note 135.
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the traffic problem, created at that point by the merging of an avenue into
the boulevard, would be eliminated. The city council approved the map
subject to the recommended conditions, and the applicant then appealed to
the courts alleging that the imposed conditions were invalid.
As a prelude to discussion of the Ayres decision, it should be noted that
there have been many cases which have sustained conditions requiring a
developer to improve and dedicate streets, 17 4 to provide curbs, drains and
sidewalks, 175 and to construct and dedicate sewer and water facilities, 17 6
when those improvements have been within the proposed subdivision. The
justification for upholding such requirements seems to be that a developer
should not be permitted to make a profit at the expense of the municipality.
Because the subsequent residents of the subdivision will demand that the
municipality furnish these necessary facilities and because, in a sense, it
was the developer's action in subdividing his tract which created this demand,
the developer should not be able to thrust the construction costs for such
facilities on the municipality, but should be made to bear the expense him77
self.'
In upholding the condition requiring Ayres to dedicate a right of way
across his tract, the California Supreme Court may have been relying on a
similar rationale. But because in the Ayres case only two lots were to front
on the right of way in question, the image of the mass of people inside the
subdivision clamoring for public facilities seems much less persuasive.
However, since the two lots were to be used for a church and a business
drive-in, it is arguable that the condition was justified so that slow-moving
traffic, church-goers and business clientele could be kept off the avenue
and the boulevard on which the lots abutted. It would seem that the court was
also justified in upholding the condition restricting a strip of land along the
boulevard to the planting of trees and shrubbery because such a condition
would promote safety by preventing ingress and egress between the proposed lots and that thoroughfare.

78

A more questionable determination was the sustaining of the conditions
requiring Ayres to dedicate the triangle and the other strip of land. The
court sought to support its conclusion by noting "that the creation and the
proposed uses of the subdivision would give rise to traffic and other conditions necessitating the widening of the boulevard" 'i and the elimination of
174.
175.
176.
See also
177.
178.

E.g., Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E.2d 503 (1952).
E.g., Allen v. Stockwell, 210 Mich. 488, 178 N.W. 27 (1920).
E.g., Mefford v. City of Tulare, 102 Cal. App. 2d 919, 228 P.2d 847 (1951).
Zastrow v. Village of Brown Deer, 9 Wis. 2d 100, 100 N.W.2d 359 (1960).
See Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 IIl. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960).
See the section entitled Conditions Related to Health and Safety, pp. 130-31

supra.
179.

34 Cal. 2d at 38, 207 P.2d at 5.
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the tip of land.180 Because the tract was to be subdivided into eleven
residential lots, one business lot and a lot used for religious purposes, it
seems clear that some traffic increase would have resulted. But because the
business drive-in and the church would not usually have carried on their
activities at the same time, the increase would not have been as great as
it might have seemed at first glance. Furthermore, because access to the
residential lots from the boulevard would have been limited, it would appear
that most of the traffic problems created by slow-moving vehicles turning
into the residential driveways would have affected traffic flow only on the
avenue on which the driveways were to be located and not on the boulevard.
Moreover, since there would have been three or four other streets, besides
the boulevard, which the subdivision traffic might have used, it would seem
that the total increase in congestion on the boulevard and at the point where
the avenue merged with that thoroughfare would not have been very great."8'
In support of the decision sustaining the strip and triangle dedication
conditions, the court cited two cases which had upheld similar conditions in
other jurisdictions ;182 however, Ayres on its facts would appear to have
been distinguishable from these cases. In the Ayres case, though not in the
others, it was shown that the municipal authorities contemplated widening
the boulevard and eliminating the tip whether or not the plaintiff intended
83

to subdivide.1

In view of three facts: (1) that the proposed subdivision would not
have greatly increased traffic on the boulevard; (2) that the contemplated
improvements would have benefited the entire Westchester District ;184 and
(3) that the municipal officials planned to make such improvements regardless
of whether Ayres sought approval of his subdivision map, it would seem
that the primary reason the Los Angeles City Council imposed the conditions
requiring dedication of the triangle and the strip along the boulevard was
not the elimination of the traffic problems which the proposed subdivision
would have created, but rather those created by the mushrooming growth of
the metropolitan area. Relying on an argument similar to this, Ayres con-tended that the conditions effected a "taking" of his property without
compensation and therefore were unconstitutional. The majority of the
180. 34 Cal. 2d at 39, 207 P.2d at 6.
181. For a case which rejects the argument that increased traffic from a subdivision
justifies imposition of conditions, see Mansfield & Swett v. Town of West Orange, 120
N.J.L. 145, 198 Atl. 225 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
182. See Newton v. American Security Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941);
Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
183. 34 Cal. 2d at 38-39, 207 P.2d at 5-6.
184. The boulevard on which the proposed subdivision abutted was one of the two
major arteries through the Westchester District, an area encompassing over 3,000 acres.
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court, at the conclusion of its opinion, addressed itself to this argument,
saying:
A sufficient answer is that the proceeding here involved is not one
in eminent domain nor is the city seeking to exercise that power.
It is the petitioner who is seeking to acquire the advantages of lot
subdivision and upon him rests the duty of compliance with
reasonable conditions for design, dedication, improvement and
restrictive use of the land.' 85
The first sentence of this statement places emphasis on the form of the proceedings in which the taking occurs. But this would not seem an adequate
distinction between what is or is not an exercise of the power of eminent
domain because, if constitutionally protected property rights' 8" are to have
any significance, their existence certainly should not be made to depend on
a matter of form.
The second sentence of the quotation seems to suggest what might be
called the "first-to-act" rule. Commenting on the Ayres case, the Southern
California Law Review' 87 articulated this rule in greater detail. The note
seemed to say that although it is normally clear when a municipality is
exercising its police power and when it is exercising its power of
eminent domain, there are occasions when this distinction is difficult.
It suggested that the controlling factor in solving the problem of which
power is being exercised is to discover who acted first. If the private
landowner acted first in requesting approval of a subdivision map, the
condition which effected the taking was incident to the police power,
but if the local officials acted first, the municipality was using its power
of eminent domain and would have to pay for its acquisition. The note
seemed to offer no justification for this rule other than that it was a rule of
convenience for deciding difficult cases. But because a landowner bears a
greater percentage of the total cost of a public improvement if he is required
to dedicate the land on which the improvement will be constructed than if
the municipality purchases that land from him, and because the question
of who bears the cost of providing a needed public improvement should not
turn on the fortuitous fact that a subdivision application has been filed, there
is need for a more rational basis of deciding these cases than is provided by
the "first-to-act" rule. An additional reason for abandoning that rule is that
it may tend to retard development of land and construction of needed improvements because both the developer and the municipality may feel that
delay is to their advantage.
185. 34 Cal. 2d at 42, 207 P.2d at 7.
186. CALIF. CONST. art. I, § 14.
187. Note, 23 So. CAL. L. REV. 261 (1950).
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It is submitted that perhaps the most fundamental principle justifying
imposition of conditions on applicants for land-use permits is that the
applicant should be willing to solve the problems which his proposed use
will create. The previously noted rationale for imposing conditions on subdivision developers seems to be founded on this principle. 88 Conditions
attached to a variance or zoning amendment further support it, because by
mitigating annoyance and inconvenience to neighboring landowners, such
conditions serve to eliminate problems which would otherwise be created
by a proposed use. 189 When attention is focused on particular conditions, it
will be seen that they are also founded on it. Consider, for instance, conditions
limiting access to a property. These have been justified as removing a safety
problem which a development could create. 1 ° Or consider conditions limiting
the number of automatic washing machines in a proposed laundramat, which
have been justified as removing health problems that might be created if
existing sewage facilities were overloaded.' 9 '
A corollary of the asserted principle is illustrated by the cases dealing
with what might be categorized as quasi-tax conditions. 1 92 These cases
suggest that where the anticipated problem will be primarily created by
something other than the proposed use, the municipality should not be able
to impose on the applicant a condition requiring him to bear the expense
which will be incurred in solving that problem.' 9 3 For example, the case
188.

See Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, supra note 177.

189. See the section entitled Conditions Attached to a Variance or Exception, pp.
112-15 supra.
190. See the section entitled Conditions Related to Health and Safety, pp. 130-31
supra.

191. Ibid.

192. Most of the cases which have considered the validity of conditions requiring
an applicant to make a money payment to a municipality have been decided on the
ground that the relevant state enabling act did not authorize the local officials to impose
such conditions. See Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, supra note 177 (alternative
ground) ; Reggs Homes v. Dickerson, 16 Misc. 2d 732, 179 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct.
1958), aff'd mem., 8 App. Div. 2d 640, 186 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1959); Haugen v. Gleason,
226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961). But cf. City of Buena Park v. Boyar, 186 Cal. App.
2d 61, 8 Cal. Rptr. 674 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) ; Longridge Estates v. City of Los Angeles,
183 Cal. App. 2d 533, 6 Cal. Rptr. 900 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
193. Consider the following statement of Justice Schaefer in Rosen v. Village of
Downers Grove, supra note 177, at 453, 167 N.E.2d at 234:
[B]ecause the requirement that a plat of subdivision be approved affords an
appropriate point of control with respect to costs made necessary by the subdivision, it does not follow that communities may use this point of control to
solve all of the problems which they can foresee. The distinction between
permissible and forbidden requirements is suggested in Ayres v. City Council
of Los Angeles, which indicates that the municipality may require the developer
to provide the streets which are required by the activity within the subdivision
but can not require him to provide a major thoroughfare, the need for which
stems from the total activity of the community.
See also In re Appeal from Radnor Township Disapproval of Subdivision Plan, 40 Del.
Co. Rep. 106 (Pa. C.P. 1953), where the court invalidated a condition requiring a
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of Kelber v. City of Upland 9 4 involved a local ordinance requiring a
developer as a condition to approval of a subdivision map to pay $30 per lot
into the park and school site fund and $99.07 per acre into the subdivision
drainage fund in lieu of constructing specified drainage structures. 95 In
striking down this ordinance, the California Court of Appeals remarked:
It rather clearly appears that these . . . provisions are fund raising
methods for the purpose of helping to meet the future needs of the
entire city for park and school sites and drainage facilities .

.

. [and

that they are] not reasonably required by the type and use of the
sub-division as related to the character of local and neighborhood
planning and traffic conditions ....
196
In light of the principle justifying imposition of conditions and the
corollary of that principle suggested by Kelber and similar cases, it is here
contended that when a court is faced with the question whether to sustain
a given condition, it should identify the problem which the condition is designed
to solve. If that problem will be primarily created by the proposed use, the condition should be upheld, though it may require dedication of land or payment of
money to the municipality; otherwise, the condition should be invalidated.
It is also contended that when applied to a case like Ayres, this problemanalysis approach, based on underlying principles of fairness, produces a
more equitable result than does the "first-to-act" rule. Moreover, by deemphasizing the significance which that rule places on the fact that an application for a land-use permit has been filed, the problem-analysis approach removes whatever incentive the developers and municipal officials might have
developer to pay the full cost of constructing a main trunk line sewer which lay beyond
his subdivided tract and which served a large drainage area besides his development.
The opinion suggests that it would be unconstitutional for a state legislature to authorize
the imposition of such a condition. Compare this case with City of Buena Park v. Boyar,
supra note 192.
194. 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957).
195. The Kelber case arose under the California Subdivision Map Act, CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE §§ 11500-625, and the issue before the court was whether the local ordinance related to the "design" and "improvement" of the subdivision, rather than whether
the ordinance was within the scope of the police power. However, it is submitted that
the language of the opinion is so strong that when the California courts are presented
with a case involving similar conditions, they will reach the same result, regardless of
the zoning context in which the case arises. Some limited support for this contention
may be found in the fact that these courts have treated other cases arising under the
Subdivision Map Act as defining the scope of the police power. See, e.g., the use of
Ayres in a subsequent variance case, Bringle v. Board of Supervisors, 54 Cal. 2d 86,
4 Cal. Rptr. 493, 351 P.2d 765 (1960).
196. 155 Cal. App. 2d at 638, 318 P.2d at 565. For a subsequent case which relies,
in part, on Kelber, see Wine v. City Council, 177 Cal. App. 2d 157, 2 Cal. Rptr. 94
(1960) (suggesting invalidity of conditions requiring payment of a large sewerage
connection charge and payment of the costs of improving certain streets which were not
within the boundaries of the proposed subdivision).
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had to delay, respectively, the development of land and the construction of
97
public improvements.
Before this Article is concluded, mention should be made of two other
situations which might be thought to present disguised exercises of the power
of eminent domain. The first is where a permit is issued authorizing expansion of a nonconforming use subject to the condition that after a stated
period, the applicant will terminate the entire use. The only case which has
considered such a conditional permit held that because the applicant had
accepted the stated condition, he could not raise the question of validity. 19
Because of the strong public interest in eliminating nonconforming uses, 199
it would seem that the condition should be sustained as within the police
power, particularly in a state which recognizes the technique of "amortizing"
such uses. 20 0 Furthermore, because the applicant is only required to change
the use of his property and is not asked to transfer title to land or buildings
to the municipality, this type of condition would not seem to raise as difficult
a problem as was presented in the Ayres case.
The second situation which presents a possible eminent domain question
arises when, in authorizing construction of a building near a public street,
a municipality imposes a condition that in the event of condemnation the size
of the condemnation award will be determined by amortizing the original
cost of the building over a term of years, which term is substantially less
than the actual useful life of that structure. A New York court has held that
such a condition is invalid on the ground that it constitutes an uncompensated
2 01
taking of property.
Conclusion
It was pointed out in the first part of this Article that a broad power
to attach conditions to land-use permits has generally been expressly conferred or readily implied only in the area of variances and exceptions. It was
197. If Ayres was, in part, incorrectly decided, it would seem that the result in
Bringle v. Board of Supervisors, supra note 195, was a fortiori incorrect. In Bringle,
the landowner used his property, under a conditional use permit, for the storage of
excavation equipment. When the permit expired, he applied for a renewal but was told
that a new permit would be issued only if he were willing to dedicate a right of way
across his land. This condition was upheld, though it would seem to have had very little
to do with solving new problems which continued operation of the business would create.
The court, in reaching its conclusion, presumed that the action of the municipality was
valid and stated without elaboration, that the landowner had failed to prove that his
use would not create traffic problems.
198. Edmonds v. Los Angeles County, 40 Cal. 2d 642, 255 P.2d 722 (1953).
199. See the last paragraph in the section entitled Regulation of Business Opera..
tions, p. 131 supra.
200. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34
(1954) Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598
(1958) City of Seattle v. Martin, 54 Wash. 2d 541, 342 P.2d 602 (1959).
201. Rand v. City of New York, 3 Misc. 2d 769, 155 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
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submitted that a similar power should also be implied in the area of zoning
amendments. Further, it was contended that a condition, whether stated in
a statute or imposed by a municipal official under a broad power, should
be limited by the scope of the police power.
When deciding whether a particular condition is within that power,
courts seem to have been influenced by such factors as: (1) whether the
condition is vague; (2) whether it is closely related to promoting public
health and safety; (3) whether it is analogous to an established type of
land-use control; (4) whether it deals with the day-to-day operations of a
business; (5) whether a nonconforming use is involved; (6) whether the
condition constitutes a personal license; (7) whether it is founded primarily
on aesthetic considerations; (8) whether it tends substantially to remedy the
problem which it is designed to solve; and (9) whether it constitutes a
disguised exercise of the eminent domain or taxing power. With particular
reference to conditions imposed on subdivision developers, it has been
suggested that the "first-to-act" rule is an inadequate justification for requiring payment of fees or dedication of land, and that a more reasonable accommodation between public and private interests would be achieved if attention
were focused on the fundamental purpose for imposing and sustaining any
conditions in this area, i.e., preventing the developer from creating problems
which the municipality will subsequently have to solve. If the suggested
problem-analysis approach were adopted, where it appears that a condition is
designed to cope with a problem primarily created by something other than
the developer's subdivision, such a condition would be struck down on the
ground that it is not within the scope of the police power.

